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1. There are at least two themes in Paul Ricoeur’s recent essay, ‘The Concept of
Responsibility: An Essay in Semantic Analysis’ (Ricoeur 2000). The first of these is in the
foreground of the essay. It concerns how the concept of responsibility has evolved in recent
times from a delimited juridical notion to a much broader moral concept. The second theme
remains in the background of the essay and alludes to theses that Ricoeur has developed
in his book, Oneself as Another (Ricoeur 1992). This theme concerns how responsibility
relates to personal and moral identity and how it emerges dialectically from social formation
and from an eliminable subjectivity. In this paper I will explicate Ricoeur’s first theme and
also explore how the second theme might solve the problem of the unassumable scope and
range of our responsibilities which the first theme might suggest.
2. Ricoeur begins his essay by explicating a traditional legal or juridical notion of
responsibility. This notion answers the question, ‘What is it to be responsible for one’s
action when that action has caused harm?’ The answer that is given is that to be
responsible in such a context is to be liable to be punished or to be obliged to pay
compensation or make reparation for the harm done. This notion of responsibility refers to
the past and seeks to connect an agent with an action that has already occurred so as to
make that agent answerable for it. Indeed, when Ricoeur explores the etymology of the
word ‘responsibility’, he links it to the notions of holding an agent to account for actions that
have been performed. But holding an agent to account presupposes the idea that the
harmful action can be imputed to that agent. To be held responsible for a harm done
presupposes that the action was indeed an intentional action of that agent. As Ricoeur
quotes a French dictionary, ‘to impute an action to someone is to attribute it to him as its
actual author, to put it, so to speak, on his account and to make him responsible for it.’
(Ricoeur 2000, 14)
3. Dieter Birnbacher expands on these points when he distinguishes retrospective
responsibility, or ‘ex post responsibility’, from responsibility for the future, or ‘ex ante
responsibility’ (Birnbacher 2001). The first is the kind of responsibility that Aristotle was
trying to ground when he discussed voluntary action in his Nicomachean Ethics while the
second is illustrated by Hans Jonas’ book The Imperative of Responsibility (Jonas 1984).
Our discussion will return us to this second sense of responsibility presently.
4. Birnbacher identifies the following conditions for ex post responsibility. First there must
be an identifiable agent who is linked to the faulty action. There must be a clear link
between the agent’s action and the harmful outcome. Parents, for example, may not be held
responsible for the sins of their children unless a direct causal link can be established
between them and the harmful action. Similarly, the responsibility of a collectivity is based
on the actions of the individual members of that collectivity and there must be an
appropriate link between those actions and the collectivity which has responsibility for them
imputed to it. Second, the agent must have contributed to the harm through his or her
intentional action or omission. Third, the agent must have had the capacity to do or not do
the harmful action. They must not have been acting involuntarily, accidentally, blindly, or
under duress. There will be considerable interpretative latitude in this condition and much
of the interest in juridical cases will be in whether and how it is fulfilled. Fourth, given the
link between ex post responsibility and being blameworthy, the responsible agent must
have been under an obligation not to perform the faulty action or to prevent the unfortunate
outcome from occurring.
5. Any imputation of an action to an agent in this way presupposes a philosophical theory of
agency. Just as Aristotle had argued that we cannot praise or blame anyone unless we
understand what it is for them to have acted voluntarily, so Ricoeur discerns the
development of the concept of imputation in Kant, for whom the idea presupposes that the
agent is the genuine originator of the act. Kant notes that this requires the transcendental
idea of freedom so as to ground the absolute spontaneity of an action even while it is also
rational to understand all events in the world, including actions, as caused by pre-existing
conditions. Kant did not fail to notice the apparent contradiction between these two ways of
conceiving action. His second critique tackles this antinomy by equating freedom with the
subsumption of agency under the moral law. In this way, freedom and imputability can be
made to coincide (Ricoeur 2000, 18). However, Ricoeur argues that the metaphysical
problems are displaced rather than solved by this strategy and that they have still not been
satisfactorily resolved in contemporary philosophy. It is at this point that the second and
muted theme of Ricoeur’s essay – that of the nature of subjectivity and the identity of
agents – makes itself manifest. I will return to this theme presently.
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6. For the moment let us pursue the theme of the juridical concept of responsibility in
Ricoeur’s essay a little further. Whereas in its traditional form this concept centred on an
identifiable agent who is deemed to be at fault, Ricoeur describes a contemporary tendency
in which this focus is lost. In many civil cases damages are awarded for harms done without
there being any imputation of fault. While some legal actions do result in certain agents
being found negligent, many actions are directed simply upon the question of which party’s
insurance company should pay the compensation. In contemporary society, the
management of risk through insurance and processes of indemnification has sometimes
replaced that of imputing responsibility and fault to particular agents. The fact that we
insure against many events that do not result from blameworthy actions or omissions is part
of this tendency. The result has been that a new kind of collective responsibility – which
Ricoeur attributes to solidarity – has weakened the imputation of particular fault to particular
individuals. Society as a whole accepts responsibility when harm occurs and sets up
processes for compensation that do not depend upon sheeting home the responsibility to
particular agents. Whether one suffers harm because of a criminal act or whether through
an ‘act of God’, the insurance company will pay.
7. There will be some variations upon this tendency in various legal jurisdictions. (Rather
than contest his claims let us assume that Ricoeur is referring primarily to the French legal
system). For example, the criminal law will seek to identify responsible agents for the sake
of punishment and also, sometimes, in order to secure compensation for the victims, Again,
in medical cases, the law scrutinises the specific practices of doctors even though
insurance companies pay the compensation. And litigation in cases of a company's
neglecting safety standards in their production or its products creates some pressure on the
individual responsibility of directors and managers even if the law allows them to escape
personal liability. These caveats aside, we may accept Ricoeur’s claim in broad terms.
What happens to the juridical notion of responsibility in the context of modern law is that it
becomes collectivised. The object of imputation becomes the community. This upholds the
values of solidarity and security and leads to actions coming to be seen as fated rather than
as the responsibility of identifiable agents.
8. This solidarity supports the feeling that in all cases of bad luck or misfortune claims for
reparation can and ought to be made by the victims. People come to feel themselves
entitled to such compensation. Within the exigencies of legal processes this, in turn,
increases the need to find someone to pay that compensation. Given the continuing hold of
the concept of ex post responsibility, this again leads the system to seek agents to hold
responsible and be at fault. According to Ricoeur, the ironic consequence is that, from a
position of solidarity, one looks further for culpability and undermines fiduciary and
contractual relationships of trust. The conceptual problem that this raises is that, if the
traditional juridical notion of responsibility depended upon imputing responsibility to an
agent, and if no agent is being singled out in these contemporary developments, then there
is no specific object of imputation and the notion of responsibility begins to float free of its
traditional associations. The term has begun to change its meaning. It becomes generalised
so that we all collectively become holders of responsibility.
9. Parallel to this evolution of the juridical concept of responsibility Ricoeur also describes
an evolution in what he calls the ‘moral concept’. The moral concept of responsibility points
to the things or people for whom we should accept responsibility. Whereas the traditional
version of this concept echoed that of the juridical concept in that it urged us to accept
responsibility for the harm that we might have done by submitting to punishment or
accepting our duty to pay compensation, the more modern notion suggests that we are
responsible, not just for our past actions, but also for future actions and for actions that will
have an impact in the future. This is the concept that Birnbacher calls ‘ex ante
responsibility’. Birnbacher notes several distinctive features of such responsibility. First, it
does not specify exactly what action one is responsible to perform and so generates
positive but underdetermined duties. Second, it has a teleological structure in that it aims at
some good or avoidance of harm in the future. The conditions that must be met for ex ante
responsibility to be imputed to an agent or group of agents include once again that the
necessary conditions of voluntary action must be met. Further, the relevant agents must
have the capacity to do what is called for. They must have the intelligence to understand
the future consequences of their actions and have the requisite information.
10. The expansion of the predictive powers of science enhances this capacity. Additionally,
the expansion of the technological powers of science increases the need for this kind of
responsibility. The increasing numbers of ‘acts of God’ that can be controlled or avoided by
technological means become risks that must be managed by the social collective in
solidarity. Precisely who in the collective holds that responsibility will be unclear, and will be
the object of political contestation. Also open to political contestation will be the question of
the scope of this moral responsibility. Given the undetermined nature of the duty, how far
into the future does ex ante responsibility extend? To privilege the present or the proximate
future would seem to evince partiality. This is another point to which I will return.
11. Ricoeur argues that it is inherent in the grammar of the contemporary moral concept of
responsibility that one is not just responsible for one’s actions, whether past or future, but
also for other people or for things of value. ‘The displacement then becomes a reversal:
one becomes responsible for harm because, first of all, one is responsible for others.’
(Ricoeur 2000, 29) Levinas has built an entire ethical theory on the idea that the depth and
vulnerability of the other elicits my responsibility for them. In this way whatever and whoever
is fragile elicits our responsibility. Ricoeur himself has argued for such a thesis when he
says in an essay entitled, ‘Fragility and Responsibility’, that ‘responsibility has the fragile as
b o r d e r l a n d s e-journal http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol3no1_2004/vanhooft_ricoeur.htm
2 of 7 5/07/2011 12:22 PM
its specific vis-à-vis, that is to say, both what is perishable through natural weakness and
what is threatened under the blows of historical violence’. (Ricoeur 1995, 15)
12. But this evolution and broadening of the moral concept of responsibility raises a number
of problems. The first of these problems is that the imputation of responsibility becomes
less clear. The future is the product of innumerable micro-decisions on the part of agents in
many parts of the world. To whom can responsibility be imputed for specific outcomes?
Anyone has the potential to do harm, whether knowingly or unknowingly, in the future.
Second, one might ask about the scope of our responsibility for others. Are we responsible
for kin and others immediately related to us, or are we responsible for all others upon whom
our actions might have a conceivable effect? Third, as already noted, how far into the future
does responsibility extend? Are we responsible for the next generation, the next two
generations, or the limitless number who are yet to come? Last, if we should seek to apply
the notion of reparation or compensation for harms that emerge in the future, who will be
held liable for making such reparations, and in what way can present agents be called to
account for effects that emerge only later, perhaps beyond their lifetime? Ricoeur approves
of Hans Jonas’ injunction that we should always act so as to ensure the future existence of
human beings (Jonas 1984), but suggests that it raises just the sort of difficulties which
have just been enumerated.
13. What is emerging here is a confluence of a generalised juridical notion of responsibility
in which the community as a whole holds and accepts responsibility without imputing fault to
individuals, and a generalised moral notion of responsibility in which individuals hold an
apparently unlimited range of responsibilities for the future. It is as if the very being of a
social agent involves being inserted into a web of responsibility. Ricoeur argues that the
relatively delimited, traditional, juridical concept of responsibility, centred as it was on
imputing liability for punishment or for making reparation to individuals for past actions, has
been expanded both within the law and in the wider society at the same time as the
emergence of a moral concept of almost limitless scope and range. This creates a spectrum
of possibilities: at one end, singular imputation; at the other, shared risk. While the juridical
notion has come to highlight shared risk, morality’s focus on our responsibility for vulnerable
and fragile others stresses singular imputation. As Ricoeur puts it, ‘To the extent that one is
rendered responsible for the moral injunction coming from others, the arrow of such an
injunction is directed at a subject capable of designating himself as the author of his acts.’
(Ricoeur 2000, 34) But should this enlarged moral concept, extending as it does to
innumerable others and a limitless future, be circumscribed in such a way as to be an
imputable responsibility which accords with our capabilities and with the scope and range of
our reasonable and prudent judgements?
14. Ricoeur reminds us that human agency is finite. While the causal consequences of our
actions may flow into a limitless future and while the collective effects of our separate
actions may generate unthought of effects, the scope of our intentions are circumscribed by
what we can know, foresee, or envisage. If we are not to be forced to the conclusion that
our responsibility is unlimited, it must be possible to strike a balance in some way between
responsibility for foreseeable and intended effects and for more remote consequences. As
Ricoeur puts it, ‘Simply neglecting the side effects of an action would render it dishonest,
but an unlimited responsibility would make action impossible.’ (Ricoeur 2000, 31) What is
needed is a judgement of practical wisdom based on recognition of our finitude. It must be
possible to make judgements about our situation which accord us a responsibility that is
reasonable in scope and range so that it can be meaningfully imputed to particular agents.
15. Although it may be appropriate for the juridical concept of responsibility to become
detached from individual imputation by tending towards a concept of collective liability
without individual fault, the moral concept is in danger of becoming meaningless if there can
be no singular imputation to a specifiable particular agent or group of agents. While we may
indeed hold a collective responsibility for the future in solidarity with others, there is still the
need to discern what particular individuals are enjoined to do by being bearers of this
responsibility. Even to prevent large and global harms to unspecifiable future peoples, all
individuals must accept responsibility for the contributions that their commissions or
omission might conceivably make to such possible harms. Exercising such a responsibility
will require not just sensitive judgement, but also a reasonable degree of knowledge about
such relevant scientific matters as the effects of our actions on the environment. We must
know what the risks for the future are in the actions we undertake. Once again, forms of
prudence will be called upon in order for individuals to act responsibly. It might also be
noted here that by calling for prudent judgement in the sense of Aristotle’s phronésis,
Ricoeur is effectively suggesting that there can be no a priori general principles which
would delineate the range or scope of anyone’s responsibility.
16. But does Ricoeur espouse a possibly complacent view of moral and ex ante
responsibility? To what extent is our responsibility limited by prudence and finitude? How
might we ensure that this position is not just a self-seeking retreat from a larger
responsibility? It is in order to answer these questions that the second, more implicit, theme
of Ricoeur’s paper needs to be explored. Ricoeur had recognised that the more concrete
and delimited juridical notion of responsibility raises difficulties for understanding the human
agent. It assumes human freedom, and such freedom is by no means clearly theorised
within philosophy. Even the more recent philosophical efforts to comprehend agency in a
way that does justice to the Kantian antimony, like those of Peter Strawson and Donald
Davidson which Ricoeur discusses, fail to do justice to the central truth about human
agency: namely, that in acting, an agent intervenes in the world by taking an initiative which
is a new irruption into the causal flow of events not capturable by a purely descriptive
philosophical method any more than by the physical or human sciences. It is this
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ineliminable subjectivity as the absolute spontaneity of an action which any account of what
it is to impute responsibility for action must preserve.
17. In this connection, Ricoeur cites with approval Merleau-Ponty’s concept of the ‘I can’
which is at the heart of any phenomenological understanding of human agency and which
is not reducible to any physical causal process. Strawson’s theory of ‘ascription’ and
Davidson’s attempt to theorise a new kind of causality under the name of ‘agent causality’
both fail to meet this test. Not only are they, according to Ricoeur, purely descriptive
accounts without phenomenological insight, but they also lose sight of the moral meaning
that imputation carries with it: that of rendering an agent responsible both morally and
legally. Ricoeur quotes Kant approvingly when the latter says, ‘A person is the subject
whose actions can be imputed to him. . . . . A thing is that to which nothing can be imputed.’
(Ricoeur 2000, 16, italics in original) It would appear then that our understanding of what it
is to impute an action or a responsibility to a person or agent is tied to our conception of
what it is to be a person or an agent.
18. It is at this point that some of the theses of Ricoeur’s recent book, Oneself and Another,
become relevant. This book includes two striking approaches to personal identity. First, it
distinguishes what Ricoeur calls ‘sameness’ from what he calls ‘ipseity’. Sameness is the
identity that is given to us by our socio-historical context. Minimally it is our identity as it
appears on our passports, but more fully it is the sum of all the social formative influences
upon us, from upbringing through to education and the accumulation of all those of my
experiences in relation to which I am passive. It is who we are seen to be by others if they
see us accurately and it is who we are seen to be by ourselves if we accept the self-image
which our social formation bequeaths to us. But such a self-image is seldom the product
only of that social formation. It arises out of a dialectic in which social construction is but
one term. The other term in this dialectic is the ineliminable subjectivity which was
described above as the creative initiative and intervention in the world which is inherent in
action. This is the term which the existential tradition since Nietzsche has focused upon as
the being-for-itself of existence, as subjectivity, or as pure becoming. In order to avoid the
subjectivism and voluntarism inherent in this one-sided account of personal identity,
Ricoeur combines it dialectically with social formation in order to theorise our personal
identity as an instance of ‘ipseity’. Ipseity is my spontaneous being as shaped over time in
response to my historicity.
19. In the second of his approaches to subjectivity, Ricoeur finds a way to mediate between
philosophical theories of subjectivity which stress a third person approach of description
and ascription as exemplified by Strawson and Davidson – philosophers who stand in a
long tradition stemming from Hume who would explain human action, for example, as being
caused by beliefs and desires conceived as mental events – and a philosophical approach
which stresses the first person approach of reflection – a tradition that arguably begins with
Descartes but of which the most recent articulation is found in existential phenomenology.
As against these, Ricoeur stresses the second person point of view of mutual address in
dialogical contexts. The central notion of identity as ipseity is that of the one who speaks to
others and is addressed by them as a ‘you’. In this approach, the questions are not, ‘What
are the criteria for ascribing personhood?’ or, ‘What does singular reflection disclose of my
authentic being?’ but, ‘Who is it who speaks and who is it that can be addressed by
others?’ The first part of this last question is centred round the notion of attestation, while
the second part of it focuses on the notion of imputation. When one speaks to another or
addresses the world in a purposeful way, one is attesting to who one is. One is declaring
where one stands, what one is committed to, and what one cares about. This is one’s
attestation to one’s identity. When one answers another’s address or responds to their call,
one acknowledges and declares who one is in response to an imputation of identity to one
on the part of others. Indeed, one makes oneself be that which the other calls upon one to
be. These questions together – ‘Who speaks?’ ‘Who acts?’ ‘Who recounts his life?’ ‘Who
designates herself as the morally responsible author of her acts?’ (Ricoeur 2000, 23) and, I
would add, ‘Who is it that can be addressed by others?’ – constitute who one is.
20. This is why Ricoeur speaks of oneself as another. One’s ipseity is constituted not just
by one’s own existential and originary being in dialectic exchange with one’s social
formation, but also by the way one is addressed by others as another and hence by what is
imputed to one by others. Indeed it is partly through this address by others that one’s social
formation is mediated. There are two points to notice about this. First, one’s identity as
ipseity is not just a function of momentary exchanges with others whom I address or who
address me. It is the function, rather, of a large number of such exchanges over time. It is
this which gives rise to a narrative conception of the self in which one is the author of one’s
own narrative even as that narrative is shaped by others and by one’s situations. Second,
the two-part question that points to one’s ipseity is articulated by me as, ‘Who is it who
speaks and who is it that can be addressed by others?’ rather than, ‘Who is it who speaks
and who is it that is addressed by others?’ Ricoeur places great stress on one’s ipseity
being a capability as much as a realisation. Once again it is Merleau-Ponty’s ‘I can’ which
captures both the dynamic and potential nature of ipseity. In my response to the call of the
other, I attest to what I can be as well as to what I am and what I have achieved.
21. These brief observations about his theory of identity would appear to explain and justify
the limitations of responsibility that Ricoeur describes in his essay. As he points out in his
etymological exploration of the term, my responsibility is a response to the call of the other.
While this call need not be limited to the other whom I meet face-to-face, neither does it
extend to others who are so remote from me that no means are at hand for hearing their
call. While I can and should envisage future generations and their circumstances, there are
cognitive limits to the scope and range of such envisaging and these circumscribe my
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hearing of the call of future others and thus the capability to which I attest in my response.
22. My finitude limits my responsiveness and thus my responsibility. While the imputation to
me of responsibility for a limitless future and innumerable others may be a part of that
pressure of social formation to which we are subject in our contemporary era of global
economies and borderless environmental impacts, and while I may be called upon by those
faceless and innumerable others to attest to that responsibility and be accountable for it,
this demand is ameliorated by my finite capabilities. I can only attest to what I am capable
of. I can only respond from what I am capable of. I can only address myself to a future I can
envisage and influence and to others whom I can imagine and preserve from harm. Just as
the imputation to me of responsibility for actions of the past depended upon seeing me as
free and thus capable of bearing that responsibility, so the imputation to me of a
responsibility for the future depends upon seeing me as capable of doing whatever an
informed and prudent stance towards that future might demand.
23. Insofar as moral identity in the sense of ipseity is a dialectical product of social
formation and primordial subjectivity and insofar as responsibility is partly constitutive of
that ipseity, so responsibility is itself the dialectical product of the global call of innumerable
others which comes to us from the future, and of our attestation and response to that call –
a response which is delimited by our finite capability and our finite knowledge. The terms of
this dialectical notion of responsibility are contained in the call that comes to us out of the
future from whatever or whoever is precious and vulnerable on the one hand, and the
originary responsiveness, delimited by my capability and knowledge, which is expressed in
my attestation and action on the other. Responsibility is something that I ‘own’ or attest to
as constitutive of my ipseity. It is, moreover, something that I ought to own or attest to in
direct proportion to the urgency, exigency, value, and vulnerability of that for which I am
responsible. Like my very identity, my responsibility is not just of my own making. It is given
me by the call of the other.
24. But this only partly answers our question about whether Ricoeur’s view is a complacent
or possibly self-seeking one. It may still be asked whether a response that is circumscribed
by what is reasonable for, and delimited to the capability of, a finite being would be
adequate to such a call. If ignorance and the inability to envisage remote consequences
defeats responsibility, we need to recall that we can be responsible for our ignorance.
Aristotle regarded ignorance as defeating the voluntariness of an action, but also argued
that we can be held responsible for our ignorance. In much the same way reasonable
ignorance of the consequences of our actions may exonerate us from responsibility for
those consequences but not from our responsibility for striving to overcome that ignorance.
We may be finite, but a perfectionist conception of human existence would urge us to push
back the boundaries of our ignorance and expand the horizons of our capabilities and thus
of our moral responsibility. Critical rationality would be central to this moral enterprise.
25. Whatever the official and unspoken reasons for the policy, many of the Australian
bureaucrats and missionaries who for many years into the nineteen sixties removed
aboriginal children whose fathers were white from their mothers in the benighted belief that
such removal would be of benefit to them thought of themselves as acting responsibly. But
Ricoeur would presumably comment that they failed to exercise critical judgement in relation
to those policies. Taking responsibility involves critical evaluation of the values and policies
inherent in the situation. Given the generalised objective responsibility that arises from
social solidarity and from the fact that our actions inevitably contribute to the future, taking
responsibility is a formation of and attestation to our ethical and political identity. As such it
requires of us that we exercise rational and critical assessments of our actions.
26. If the delimitation of responsibility is a matter of judgement then it is not just a function of
our facticity, situatedness, and our finitude. It is chosen and must be so under some
normative standard. As we attest to our identity, so we attest to the scope of our
responsibility. My response to the call of the future goes to define the quality of my ethical
being. I am able to reject responsibility on the grounds of my finitude, but I must also extend
my capability for accepting a larger responsibility by exercising critical and reflexive thought.
27. It may be asked whether finite and partially socially constructed agents have the
capability of thinking beyond the frameworks of their formation. I have said that ipseity is a
product of a dialectic involving such social formation and one’s ineliminable subjectivity.
Whence, then, the critical rationality which is charged with expanding one’s cognitive and
concernful capability for responsibility?
28. Ricoeur would reject an abstract, a-historical, and formalist Kantian conception of
reason in favour of an Aristotelian conception of contentful rationality as an aspect of our
teleological being. Ricoeur interprets the Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia, which is so
often translated in individualistic terms as ‘happiness’, as designating the inherent ethical
aim and capability of ‘aiming at the "good life" with and for others in a just society’ (Ricoeur
1992, 172). Insofar as our ipseity is directed upon such a telos, insofar as we attest to a
goal of improving our selves and our societies, and insofar as our functions and capabilities
include those of deliberative practical wisdom or phronésis, critical and rational reflection is
a fulfilment of such a telos and is an activity that virtuous persons would engage in.
29. Whatever might be the constraints and horizons placed upon us by social formations for
such thinking, we have the capacity and the tendency to break out of such constraints and
it is virtuous for us to do so. We have an inherent and inchoate sense of happiness,
compassion, and fairness implicit in our tendency toward eudaimonia along with the critical
faculties required to evaluate social conditions against this sense. Levinas confirms this
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view in his arguments in favour of an ineliminable subjectivity which includes a capacity for
substantive, ethical reason (Levinas 2003). It is on this basis that ethical reform has always
been possible from within moral communities. And it is on the basis of this possibility and
demand for virtue that we are always called upon by the call of the other to strive to
transcend the finitude of our historical ipseity.
30. Let us now recall Birnbacher’s conditions for imputing ex post responsibility, particularly
his insistence that the agent must have had the capacity to do or not do the harmful action
and must not have been acting involuntarily, accidentally, blindly, or under duress.
Moreover, his conditions for the ascription of ex ante responsibility include that relevant
agents must have the capacity to do what is called for and must have an understanding of
the future consequences of their actions. His thinking belongs to what Bernard Williams
(Williams 1985) has called ‘the morality system’, which is a way of thinking about ethics that
focuses exclusively upon obligation. One of this system’s several principles is that ‘ought
implies can’. What this means is that a person cannot be blamed for not doing what they
were not able to do. Those bureaucrats and missionaries who assisted in stealing half-cast
children from their mothers and kept them incarcerated on missions to train them for menial
work in the white man’s world because that is what their world-view and that of their sector
of society thought was best would be blameless in this way of thinking. Given their view of
things, it is said, they could not have done otherwise (and their heirs, today, do not have an
obligation to apologise to their victims). They could not be held responsible.
31. But on the fuller view of responsibility as a virtue that is suggested by Ricoeur’s work
we can say that those bureaucrats and missionaries failed in the virtue of sensitive
judgement which Aristotle calls phronésis. They failed to heed the call both of the grieving
mothers and children and of their own implicit quest for ethical improvement through
compassion and fairness. They accepted the prevailing social and cultural norms without
heeding any inner stirrings of responsibility that might have been awakened in them by the
suffering of those with whom they were dealing. Theirs was a failure of responsibility based
upon a too easy acceptance of the socially induced constraints on their own sensitivity.
While doing what they thought was right they failed to fulfil their ipseity as virtuous agents.
They did not accept responsibility.
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Author's Note
I am indebted to helpful comments from two anonymous reviewers of this paper as well as
to helpful discussion at the conference on Unassumable Responsibility held at the
Australian National University in September 2003.
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